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1 Introduction 
 
 “In deciding the right amount for this [foreign exchange] reserve he endeavoured to arrive 
at a reasoned estimate of the magnitude of the drain which India might have to meet through 
the sudden withdrawal of foreign funds, or through a sudden drop in the value of Indian 
exports (particularly jute and, secondarily, wheat) as a result of bad harvests or poor prices. 
This is the sort of calculation which every central bank ought to make.”  
       (John Maynard Keynes, 1930: 276-277)  
The global stock of international reserves has grown rapidly over the past two decades. 
International reserves, or foreign exchange reserves, are defined as the stock of liquid assets - 
- usually in the form of foreign government bonds - which are available to monetary 
authorities for balance of payments financing (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1993: 
§424; 2001: §135). The breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in the 1970s and the 
subsequent propagation of exchange rate flexibility among countries was expected to 
gradually reduce the need for international reserves, because countries would no longer have 
to defend the peg of their domestic currencies through interventions. Instead, global reserves 
have quintupled since the 1960s and increased dramatically since the 2000s, covering over 
$11 trillion in 2016 (Bloomberg indicators). About half of that amount is kept by emerging 
markets and developing countries (EMDCs), particularly in the Asian region. The list is 
headed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since 1981, the PRC has experienced a 
25% average yearly increase of its reserve stock and now holds over $3 trillion in reserves. 
 The rapid build-up of international reserves by emerging-market economies (EMEs) in 
recent years, particularly in the Asian region, has renewed old discussions about the reasons 
why countries hold them in the first place. These discussions have a long tradition of being 
translated into empirical work. Since the 1960s research has tried to determine which factors 
influence the demand in terms of how many reserves countries need to address 
macroeconomic issues, while minimizing the costs of holding reserves. The last twenty years 
have witnessed a revival of such studies which attempt to explain the reserve build-up by 
EMDCs. The majority of studies analyse multiple countries or regions at once and often only 
explain the phenomenon in economic terms, yet in so doing tend to disregard the political 
economy motivations that affect this demand. This study argues that the Chinese experience 
of reserve accumulation is significantly different from other countries. Apart from the colossal 
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size of its reserve holdings that dwarf the holdings of other EMDCs, China’s history of 
planned economy and unique political economy of market transition may impact its demand 
for international reserves in completely different ways. 
 This thesis holds that we cannot fully grasp the empirical evidence on China’s reserve 
demand without an understanding of the political and institutional environment surrounding 
it. The IMF has been at the forefront of the reserve debate and rightly warned us that “using 
regressions to provide guidance on the adequacy of individual countries’ reserves depends on 
an assumption that there are no systematic biases towards over- or under-insurance for the 
sample as a whole” (IMF, 2011). Political and institutional biases in particular have a 
systematic effect on the size and management of a country’s foreign exchange reserves and 
may have had a decisive influence on the expansion of reserve holdings in the PRC. This 
makes the case for a single-country analysis of the PRC that combines these approaches. The 
aim of this study is to explore the links between China’s demand for international reserves 
and the broader aspects of its political economy since the ‘reform and opening-up’ that was 
started in 1978. The analysis will revolve around the following research question: 
How has the structure of China’s politico-economic model been associated with the 
management of and the demand for foreign exchange reserves?   
 This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 will start with a discussion of the 
political economy aspects of China’s monetary and foreign exchange reserve policy. This 
section will explain how China’s reserve management is positioned within the country’s 
institutional and political frameworks. Section 3 will provide an overview of the academic 
debate and the economic theory which defines the demand and need for international reserves 
among countries. The fourth section will review the empirical literature since the 1960s, 
including the existing but limited empirical work focused on the PRC. Based on the 
theoretical considerations and previous econometric applications, this study will introduce a 
reserve-demand model in section 5 to analyse the impact of changes in China’s 
(macro)economic fundamentals on the short- and long-run demand for international reserves. 
The results section will attempt to interpret the empirical dynamics of China’s demand for 
international reserves in the light of its politico-economic model. 
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2 Reserve demand and policy in China: 
 Trends and explanations 
 
International reserves are a normal item in the toolkit of central banks. Every country engaged 
in international trade and investment, regardless of size or level of development, holds at least 
some quantity to pay for imports and to insure against exogenous shocks and international 
liquidity shortages. While the growth of foreign exchange reserve holdings has been a world-
wide phenomenon among EMDCs over the last 20 years, holdings of the PRC have grown at 
unprecedented rates. This section will take a political economy perspective to explain the 
dynamics of China’s monetary policy and the build-up of foreign exchange reserves, its close 
relationship with the fundaments of China’s export- and investment-led growth model, as well 
as the current and future implications of this economic model both for the PRC and the global 
economy.  
  
2.1 Stylized facts and trends 
Barring developed countries like Switzerland and Japan, international reserves are now 
increasingly concentrated in developing countries, ranging from major oil-exporters in the 
Middle-East to EMEs in South-America and Asia. In real terms, growth rates have been 
especially high for the Asian region. As of December 2016, no less than eight Asian countries 
10 
 
were among the world’s largest holders of foreign reserves: Japan, Taiwan (Republic of 
China), India, South-Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and the PRC. The PRC 
surpassed Japan as the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange in February 2006. China’s 
reserves have grown by 25% per year since 1981 and it is now by far the world’s biggest 
holder, with around $3.2 trillion in (mostly dollar-denominated) reserve assets. With that, 
China is dwarfing notoriously large hoarders such as Japan, South-Korea and Saudi-Arabia 
(figure 1).  
Since the growth of a country’s international reserves tends to reflect the growth of total 
output, it is helpful to scale reserve holdings by standard ratios. These ratios have been used 
extensively in formal and more informal assessments that try to demonstrate the differences in 
reserve demand among countries. Figure 2 scales foreign reserves as a percentage of GDP for 
a selection of Asian countries and advanced economies, including the United States and Great 
Britain. While the ratio of reserves to GDP for most industrialized countries has been steady 
over time at approximately 5 percent, we can see that reserve levels in Asia started to rise in 
the 1990s. Reserves of the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong are now about as high as 
total output. We can see that the reserve-to-GDP ratio for the PRC has decreased by about 20 
percent since 2009. This supports the argument of many analysts that the rate of reserve 
accumulation in China came to a halt in 2010 and has started to decrease since 2013. They 
attribute the drop mainly to stagnating economic growth in China (Neely, 2017). The PRC 
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now has roughly 30 percent of GDP invested in foreign reserves and ranks mid-range among 
its neighbouring countries.  
 Yet another way to assess the relative growth of foreign exchange holdings is by 
looking at the number of months for which a country can use reserves to support current 
import levels. The ratio of reserves to imports is an indicator of the probability and severity of 
an economic crisis, as it reflects the amount of time that a country could withstand a potential 
stand-still of in- and outflows. Figure 3 shows that the ratio is especially high for major oil-
exporters such as Saudi-Arabia that deal with market price fluctuations and the risk of falling 
exports on a daily basis. This is also a reality for manufacturing-driven economies like China 
who are dependent on a constant stream of raw materials to feed their industries. We can see 
that China has the highest level of reserves to imports in the Asian region, which should be 
regarded in relation to the total volume of trade.  
 A final measure worth looking at is the ratio of exchange reserves and the money 
supply. Indicators for the money supply in a country are typically divided between ‘narrow’ 
money (M0 or M1) and ‘broad’ money (M2 or M3). Narrow money is the amount in 
circulation of material currency, including coins and notes (M0), complemented by deposit 
accounts that can be easily converted into cash (M1). The broad money supply resembles M1 
plus short-term time deposits in banks and 24-hour money market funds (M2), as well as  
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longer-term time deposits and money market funds with a maturity of more than 24 hours 
(M3). This study uses the broad money supply (M2) as an indicator of changes in the 
domestic money supply. Like the measure of reserves to months of import, this ratio is an 
indicator of the adequacy of reserves in the event of a crisis but from the perspective of a 
country’s capital account. The ratio is widely used as a measure of the potential for and depth 
of resident-based capital flight from the domestic currency (Edison, 2003). Figure 4 indicates 
that, compared with the amount of renminbi (RMB) flowing around in the Chinese economy, 
the size of China’s exchange reserves and thus its capacity to attenuate capital outflows is 
limited. The PRC has a ratio below 10 percent, while the IMF recommends a 20 percent 
upper-bound threshold (IMF, 2011).   
 In short, China’s $3 trillion-plus international reserves look formidable by all 
measures, except for the ratio of reserves and the broad money supply. The remainder of this 
section will attempt to explain how these observations relate to China’s monetary and 
international reserve policy characterized by managed exchange rates, capital controls and 
financial repression.  
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2.2 Explanations for China’s reserve accumulation   
 
2.2.1 China’s growth miracle 
Ever since the start of reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s, a rapidly growing 
export sector and high inflow of FDI helped to transform the PRC from a poor and nearly 
autarchic country into the world’s largest manufacturing economy. By the time Deng 
Xiaoping made his famous ‘Southern Tour’ in 1992 that gave the final push for China’s 
economic development, the Chinese economy was looking at double-digit growth averaging 
10 percent per year (figure 5). Per capita GDP has grown at a similar pace, which drastically 
increased the standard of living and altered the lives of over 600 million Chinese that were 
pulled out of (extreme) poverty (Lin, 2011). Considering its remarkable rise as a global 
manufacturing economy, the PRC was famously presented as the ‘new workshop of the 
world’ in the popular press after the example of 19th century Britain. (The Economist, 2002). 
Figure 5 shows that China now depends for a quarter of its GDP on exports, with peaks above 
35 percent in the early 2000s in the run-up to the global financial crisis. To illustrate this in 
real terms, in 2016 the PRC imported for about $1.6 trillion from the rest of the world, while 
export levels amounted to a staggering $2.1 trillion (CIA World Factbook). This level of 
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exports is almost 1.5 times the size of that of the world’s second largest exporter, the United 
States and two times that of Germany, the third biggest exporting economy.  
 
2.2.2 The (im)balance of payments  
While the numbers look bright, the focus on export-led growth has caused a number of 
distortions in China’s pattern of trade which are associated with the influx of foreign reserves. 
One side-effect of its workshop status is that the Chinese economy has run surpluses in the 
current account since the early 1990s (figure 5). These are reflected by current account 
deficits in other countries that have a higher ratio of imports over exports. At a superficial 
level, the accumulation of international reserves by the PRC seems like a natural consequence 
of imbalances that have characterized global trade for more than two decades. As depicted by 
figure 6, since the 1990s the PRC has run structural current account surpluses on the left-hand 
side with evenly large trade deficits chalked up by Western countries (particularly by the 
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United States) on the right-hand side of the balance sheet. As a rule, exports are paid for in 
dollars and to a lesser extent in euros, pounds or other currencies from the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) currency basket.1 Since exports exceed imports, China experiences a 
net inflow of international reserves. In this respect, the situation in the PRC is not much 
different from oil-exporting EMDCs and the more advanced surplus economies like Germany 
and Japan. 
 However, these events only partly explain China’s surging exchange reserve holdings. 
China’s reserves seem to be much larger than the amount that would result from extensive 
trade and current account imbalances, let alone needed for day-to-day macroeconomic 
purposes. While China’s current account channel dominates the accumulation of international 
reserves (Jeanne, 2007), it is not the only channel through which it is taking in reserves. In 
theory, a country’s balance of payment equals zero meaning that the current account on the 
one side and the capital and financial account on the other should balance each other out. 
Under normal macroeconomic conditions (hence, without any government intervention) a 
surplus in the one account is reflected by a deficit in the other, and vice versa. This rule does 
not apply to the PRC, however. China has run so-called ‘twin’ surpluses, reflecting not only 
the dominance of exports over imports but also inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) over 
outward investment, which has resulted in the surplus in the capital account.  
 The growth of reserves in China’s capital and financial account can be explained from 
a deeper, more systemic point of view. China’s financial system is considered the least 
market-oriented institution of the Chinese economy. Historically, capital flows have been 
controlled by the Chinese government which upholds a policy of ‘lenient entry and stringent 
exit’. The capital account is effectively closed and it is nearly impossible for Chinese citizens 
to invest in international asset markets (Chun, Zheng and Spiegel, 2015). While domestic 
financial flows as well as outward investment are subject to strict regulations, inbound FDI 
has always been stimulated by the Chinese government because it fuels the government’s 
overall goal of rapid economic growth (Chen et al., 2007; Sauvant and Nolan, 2015). As such, 
the accumulation of international reserves on the capital account balance sheet reflects the 
interplay of China’s underdeveloped and highly controlled financial system, combined with 
its monetary policy characterized by managed exchange rates.  
                                                          
1 The RMB was included in the SDR basket in 2015 and has effectively become an official reserve currency 
since October 2016. It has a weight of 10.92 percent, which is more than the pound and yen (8.09 and 8.33 
percent respectively) but is still dwarfed by the US dollar (41.73) and euro (30.93 percent). IMF (2015).  
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2.2.3 Monetary policy and exchange rate management 
Until the 1990s, the PRC maintained a dual-track exchange rate regime which offered two 
different foreign currency prices of the RMB. The dual-track system was unified in 1994 and 
China employed a fixed regime until the early 2000s with the RMB pegged to the value of the 
dollar. Influenced by a round of financial reforms, which included the listing of state-owned 
banks and limited capital account liberalization, China decided to de-peg from the dollar in 
2005 and to fix the price to a basket of world currencies instead. The reforms resulted in the 
adoption of a ‘managed floating band’, which is a hybrid of a ‘purely’ fixed and floating rate 
regime. In China’s current currency regime, the value of the RMB is allowed to float within a 
predetermined band with a price floor and ceiling. This allows China’s central bank, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC), to intervene “when the exchange rate exceeds the 
predetermined band, or when the capital account experiences large imbalances (…) or the 
financial market falls into crisis-scale turmoil” (PBoC Deputy Governor Yi Gang, 2012).    
 By way of the price ceiling the PBoC is allowed to intervene in currency markets to 
hold down the RMB exchange rate against other currencies, most notably against the US 
dollar. Historically, exchange market intervention has been an important element of China’s 
export-led growth strategy because it holds down relative prices of Chinese exports and thus 
stimulates external demand. Intervention basically entails that the central bank goes out to buy 
the equivalent of its balance of payments surplus in US dollars (or euros, yen or pounds) to 
maintain the domestic exchange rate against this currency. For this purpose, the PBoC collects 
the foreign-currency receipts of exporters on a large scale. The central bank will have to issue 
more RMB to be able to purchase these receipts, which will increase the domestic monetary 
base and thus leads to inflation.  
 The PBoC, in turn, will try to offset inflationary pressures by ‘sterilizing’ reserves 
(Mohanty and Turner, 2005; Rodrik, 2006; ). A report by the Federal Reserve’s Working 
Group on Exchange Market Intervention provides a formal definition for sterilization: 
“Sterilized intervention means a change in the monetary authorities’ net foreign currency 
assets which is offset by a corresponding change in their net domestic assets, so that their 
monetary liabilities (or, specifically, the monetary base) remain unchanged” (Jurgensen, 
1983). The PBoC issues government bonds and other local currency assets in exchange for the 
increased RMB in circulation, which are bought by commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. In the case of China, the sterilization bonds largely end up on the balance sheets 
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of its state-owned banking sector. 
 Even though sterilized intervention seems like a basic ‘pay out and claw back’ 
arrangement (after all, sterilization bonds end up on the balance sheets of the ICBC and other 
commercial banks, which are to a greater or lesser extent tied to the state), there is a limit to 
the amount of bonds that can be absorbed by the market. When the accumulation of reserves 
continues it will eventually result in higher interest rates. Also, there is a limit to the central 
bank’s discretionary supply of government bonds. In order to achieve its larger policy goal, 
the PBoC started issuing its own bonds and other lower-quality local currency assets. In an 
attempt to hold down the issuing costs central bank bonds typically bear low, below market 
interest rates. In China they are sold nevertheless, in high volumes, to China’s commercial 
banks of which many are legally required or ‘morally persuaded’ by the PBoC to purchase 
central bank bills. By selling bills to commercial banks against low rates, the central bank 
essentially shifts some of the costs of sterilization onto the domestic banking sector. Zhang, 
(2012) estimates that the total cost of sterilization shared by the banking sector from 2003 to 
2010 reached RMB 1.3 trillion, or $200 billion.  
 
2.3 Domestic effects  
China’s commercial banks, in turn, distribute the cost of reserve sterilization to households in 
the form of impaired access to finance. Zhang (2012) describes this arrangement as a 
‘sterilization cost-sharing mechanism’ established by the Chinese government, involving the 
PBoC, commercial (state-owned) banks and Chinese households. The government has kept 
this mechanism in place by imposing interest-rate regulations and asymmetric capital controls 
on households. As mentioned earlier, China’s capital account has not been fully liberalized 
which limits the opportunity of Chinese households to invest in foreign assets. Domestic asset 
markets have either been unstable or overwhelmed by demand, such as the Chinese real estate 
market (Glaeser, 2017). This leaves very few options for households to invest their wealth but 
to deposit it in China’s domestic commercial banks.  
 Even though interest rates in China have been liberalized to some extent in recent 
years, the consumer deposit rate and the benchmark loan interest rate are still tightly regulated 
by the PBoC. The spread between these rates represents the profit margin of China’s 
commercial banks. By enforcing a stable interest rate spread between banks and end-users, the 
central bank can shift some of the cost of sterilization to the banking sector by lowering the 
18 
 
yield on central banks bonds, while making sure that commercial banks will continue to 
receive a reasonable profit. Households, on the other hand, are faced with very low or even 
persistently negative deposit rates. Zhang (2012) argues that the combination of predatory 
interest-rate regulations and capital controls represents a form of financial repression, in 
which Chinese households bear most of the costs of exchange rate fixing by the PBoC.    
Liberalization of interest rates and a relaxation of capital controls on Chinese households 
would put the full cost of sterilization on the PBoC and China’s state-owned banks. This 
would make sterilized intervention unsustainable in the long run.  
The persistence of interest-rate regulations and other repressive financial policies supports the 
argument by international economists that the Chinese government is facing the classic 
trilemma in its policy goals of maintaining high external demand and FDI (Chi Lo, 2015). 
Figure 7 illustrates this policy trilemma, or impossible trinity, which holds that a country can 
never accomplish more than two out of the three policies of exchange rate fixation, sovereign 
monetary policy and capital account openness. The PBoC conducts independent monetary 
policy and strictly controls the value of the RMB exchange rate. However, in order to 
accomplish these goals it has to restrict international capital flows because further 
liberalization of the capital account would put pressure on domestic interest rates and, 
eventually, on the value of the exchange rate. 
 To put it in different terms, the Chinese government applies a monetary policy which 
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essentially maximizes GDP growth at the expense of domestic consumption and households’ 
standard of living. Financial repression in the form of capital controls and interest-rate 
regulations essentially works as a tax on households and a subsidy to investors (Dollar, 2013). 
Because of the impaired access to finance, Chinese citizens see no other way than to stack up 
their wealth. This has, inter alia, resulted in a large domestic savings glut which has been 
regularly observed in the literature (Bernanke, 2005; Dollar, 2013; Lardy and Borst, 2013). At 
the same time, the rapid growth of per capita GDP has created a Chinese middle-class which 
is eagerly looking for ways to diversify its wealth. Recent reports have pointed at the 
increased resident-based capital flight resulting from Chinese households and companies 
looking for ways to invest their money abroad and circumvent capital account restrictions 
(Chan, 2017).  
 
2.4 International implications 
The PBoC’s far-reaching interventions in the exchange market have been criticized in recent 
years by foreign policy-makers and other observers outside the region. While China’s ample 
monetary policy has boosted economic growth at home, it not only puts pressure on the 
domestic economy but has also contributed to the growth of global imbalances. An often-
heard critique is that the PRC has pushed other economies out of the market by combining a 
favourable exchange rate regime with low labour costs. China’s terms of trade are regarded as 
unfair competition by advanced economies, an argument which cropped up once again during 
the recent elections in the United States. Critique also comes from other EMEs, such as 
Russia and Brazil, which argue that China’s currency interventions are costing them market 
share. 
 A second international implication is related to the active management of reserves. 
The PBoC invests large amounts in the debt of advanced economies, especially in US 
Treasuries. China reportedly holds as much as 70 percent of its foreign reserves in US 
government paper, competing with other countries for US bonds which drives up the price. 
This has caused the peculiar situation in which the PRC accumulates international reserves at 
high rates and lends them straight back to the United States and other deficit countries at 
much cheaper rates (Cho, 2014). This ‘Sino-American co-dependency’ situation has 
continued since the late 1970s, in which China structurally finances American deficits so that 
the US will continue to provide the much-needed external demand for Chinese products 
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(Eichengreen, 2005; Bond, 2010; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2010; 2013). Hence, while China’s 
monetary and exchange rate policy tends to suppress consumption at home, it has the opposite 
effect for the United States and other deficit countries.  
  
Considering the size of China’s reserve holdings, which amount to over $3 trillion, the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves in a traditional central bank portfolio of foreign bonds is 
high. Opportunity cost is the difference between the average yield on international reserves 
and the marginal productivity of alternative investments (usually proxied by the value of 
short-term deposit rates). While China’s deposit rates used to be below the interest rates of 
targeted foreign bonds, global interest rates on government paper have dropped significantly 
since the financial crisis. Figure 8 shows that the spread between China’s 3-month deposit rate 
and the equivalent US Treasury bill has increased since 2007 and currently stands at around 
1.5 percent, which suggests that the Chinese monetary authorities face significant opportunity 
cost over its foreign exchange reserve holdings. In response, China’s monetary authorities try 
to find other outlets with a higher risk-return profile. As part of this active management of 
reserves it created so-called reserve investment funds (RIFs), a specific type of sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF) that invests reserve money in fixed income, equities, real estate and a 
variety of other higher risk-return assets around the world.  
 SWFs are designed as standalone investment funds with a legal mandate that is less 
tight and allows for a more explicit return objective than do central banks (Balding, 2012; 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
In
te
re
st
 r
at
e
FIGURE 8: CHINESE DEPOSIT RATE VS. US
TREASURY BOND RATE, 3-MONTH MATURITY (1978-
2016)
China deposit rate US T Bill 3 month Rate
21 
 
Megginson and Fotak, 2014). The purpose of these funds is to increase returns on reserves 
and to reduce the opportunity cost of carrying excessive foreign exchange reserves on the 
central bank’s balance sheet. China currently runs two RIFs. SAFE Investment Company is 
connected to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), a branch of the PBoC. 
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, a US-based think-tank, the fund manages 
an estimated $450 billion of foreign financial assets. A second SWF, China Investment 
Corporation (CIC), was created in 2007 and has around $800 billion of assets under 
management. 
 In political circles, the large holdings and active management of reserves by EMDCs 
is regarded with suspicion because it seems to have shifted financial firepower away from, 
predominantly Western, deficit countries to surplus countries in the traditional ‘East’. Being 
the main debtor country, public debate in the United States is frequently dominated by the 
doings of China. The intensity of the debate was famously illustrated in 2007 by the reactions 
to an article by Chinese scholar He Fan, who unintentionally added fuel to the flames by 
stating that ”(…) thanks to the trade surplus, China has accumulated a large sum of US dollars 
and its world largest foreign exchange reserve is mostly in US dollars” (…), and that “the 
Chinese central bank will be forced to sell US dollars once the renminbi appreciates 
dramatically, which might lead to a  mass depreciation of the US dollar against other 
currencies” (He Fan, 2007). The column triggered alarming stories in the Western popular 
press suggesting that China was considering the so-called ‘financial nuclear option’. It was 
believed that by dumping its substantial holdings of dollar-denominated government debt, 
China could instantly tip the US economy into recession (Panzner, 2009; Navarro and Autry, 
2011). 
2.5 The future of China’s economic model 
The reasons that motivate the Chinese government to maintain a monetary policy based on 
financial repression, capital regulations and currency interventions have been a matter of 
debate. Arguably, it is the inevitable consequence of the leadership’s long-lived goals of 
stimulating economic growth, creating jobs and maintain social stability. Since the start of 
reforms in 1978, China’s institutional framework has been geared to generate high external 
demand and the foreign investment necessary to pull the country out of the abyss. The 
Chinese government now desperately tries to preserve the status quo, but recent developments 
seem to catch up with the aims of the government. Since 2012, the Chinese economy has been 
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showing signs of a declining export sector and GDP growth. This has, inter alia, influenced 
the size of its reserve holdings. According to analysts, the rate of reserve accumulation came 
to a halt in 2012 and has started to decrease since 2013 as a result of stagnating economic 
growth in the PRC. Whereas the PBoC was used to purchase dollar-denominated assets, it has 
recently been selling off its dollars and buying RMB to sustain the value of the domestic 
exchange rate (Neely, 2017).  
 With the slowdown of the economy there are voices both within and outside the 
country for a ‘rebalancing’ of the Chinese economy, away from export- and investment-led 
growth towards an intensive growth path underpinned by domestic consumption. Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao told the National People’s Congress in 2007 that “unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and unsustainable development remains a prominent problem” in China. 
Outside the country, the 2000s has seen an increasing number of studies that advocate a 
rebalancing and offer recommendations for a smooth transition towards a more consumption-
driven economy (Prasad & Rajan 2006; Blanchard & Giavazzi 2006; Lardy 2007; Zheng, 
Bigsten & Hu 2009; Dollar, 2013; Lardy and Borst, 2013). 
 
3 Theory and related literature 
This section will discuss the origins and development of modern economic theories that try to 
explain the demand for international reserves among countries. The analyses in this thesis are 
primarily built on the concept of ‘optimal’ reserves, which evolved from Keynesian micro-
theories of the demand for money and has been a leading theory since the 1960s. The concept 
of optimal reserves is closely related to theories on the motives for holding international 
reserves, as well as the welfare effects of reserve accumulation. Paragraph 3.2 will discuss the 
motives that underpin the decision for countries to hold on to foreign currency, followed by 
the welfare economic approach which is mainly concerned with the effects of the growth of 
reserves on a global scale. The last paragraph will introduce the theory of optimal reserve 
levels, which is based on a cost-benefit approach to the demand for international reserves and 
represents the main theoretical underpinning for the analysis in this study. 
 
3.1 (Post-)Keynesian approaches to the demand for money 
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Research on the demand for international reserves has a long tradition in Keynesian 
economics. As one of the principal architects of the Bretton Woods Agreement, Keynes’ was 
involved in the institution of the fixed exchange rate regime and the US dollar as a global 
reserve currency after the Second World War. Contemporary research in monetary economics 
has elaborated extensively on his views to explain the interactions of surplus and deficit 
countries, as well as on Keynesian theories about the demand for (international) liquidity. 
Keynes’ liquidity preference theory was further developed (and challenged) by other 
economists of Keynesian persuasion. The main contributions discussed in this paragraph were 
made individually by Tobin (1956; 1958) and Baumol (1952), who’s inventory approach to 
the transactions demand for money provides the theoretical basis of the macroeconomic 
theory of optimal reserve levels. 
 
3.1.1 Liquidity preference theory and the motives for holding money 
Modern theories on the demand for reserves can be traced back to Keynes’ theory of the 
micro-demand for money, or what he called ‘liquidity preference’ (1936). Up until then, 
monetary economics had been dominated by a single focus on the supply-side of money as a 
medium of exchange. Theoretical perceptions on the demand for money were restricted to the 
so-called transactions motive of holding money, in which demand is a function of an 
individual’s income, the number of transactions, the price of those transactions and the 
quantity and velocity of the money supply. Classical economists such as Irving Fisher (1911), 
who’s famous Quantity Theory of Money only considers the function of money as a medium 
of exchange, or the Cambridge Cash-balance approach purported by Neoclassical economists 
Pigou (1917) and Alfred Marshall (1923) did recognize its function as a store of value but 
their analysis did not account for influencing factors such as wealth, interest rates and 
speculation. In particular, Pigou acknowledged the precautionary motive where money 
holdings act as a hedge against unforeseen contingencies. 
 Keynes’ liquidity preference theory represented a resolute break with the dominant 
school of thought at the time because it laid emphasis on a third motive. The main question 
coined by Keynes (himself a Cambridge economist) is why people should hold their money in 
liquid form just so they can make transactions, while they can receive interest by lending it 
out or by investing it in bonds. In his ground-breaking work, the General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936), Keynes posited that the desire to hold money is 
prompted by three main motives. Similar to the classical monetary view on money as a 
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medium of exchange, the first is the transactions motive which refers to the public’s demand 
for material currency to be able to make transactions at all times. Secondly, Keynes supported 
Pigou’s proposition that money is held for precautionary reasons. The final motive for 
people’s liquidity preference identified by Keynes is the speculative motive. This was a 
revolutionary contribution to the theory of the demand for money, as the motive explains why 
the public holds ‘surplus’ money (that exceeds the amount necessary due to the other two 
motives) in the face of interest-yielding bonds and other financial assets they can invest in to 
“secure profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth” (Keynes, 
1936: 170-171). 
 By acknowledging the speculative motive Keynes not only introduced the asset 
function of money but also the interest rate as a determinant of its demand, instead of just real 
income which had been the leading Neoclassical stand. Keynes argued that income as a single 
variable only explains the transactions and precautionary demand for money, but not the 
speculative demand resulting from the speculative motive for holding cash. Money held under 
this motive would be used to speculate in bond-dealings with fluctuating interest rates. 
According to Keynes, there is an inverse relationship between the interest rate on these bonds 
and money holdings due to opportunity cost. When people anticipate on rising bond prices 
they will expect falling interest rates in the future causing them to invest all their money in 
bonds and sell at high prices, and vice versa. At a lower rate of interest people lose less by not 
investing their money and subsequently hold all of it in cash, while they would lose more by 
not lending it out when interest rates are higher. This can be written as:  
 
 
Md = 𝐿(𝑌, 𝑖) 
𝐿𝑌 > 0, 𝐿𝑖 ≤ 0 
 
 
 
  
, where Md is the aggregate demand for money and a function of two separate components: 
𝐿(𝑌) represents the transactions and precautionary demand which is an increasing function of 
real income only; and 𝐿(𝑖) the speculative demand as a decreasing function of the rate of 
interest (Keynes, 1936: 166-168).  
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3.1.2 Tobin’s portfolio selection model  
In his famous article, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk” (1958), James Tobin 
formulated a risk aversion theory about the demand for money for what he believed “is 
essentially the original Keynesian explanation” (Tobin, 1958: 70). In his approach based on 
portfolio selection, Tobin aimed to correct two defects of Keynes’ theory of liquidity 
preference. The first defect is that Keynes does not relate the demand for money to the 
existence of uncertainty about the potential risk of an investment, which is demonstrated in 
the inelasticity of expectations about future rates of interest. The second is the Keynesian 
assumption that money is held in either cash or bonds.   
 The first drawback observed by Tobin is that the theory of liquidity preference 
presumes that people know the interest rate on bonds with certainty. Moreover, the theory 
also holds that the transactions demand for money is only a function of real income and 
therefore ‘interest inelastic’, in that demand is not affected by the rate of interest. In Keynes’ 
representation, an investor always has full information about the expected future interest rates 
of the bonds he may bet his money on. Tobin’s theory opposes this and builds on the idea that 
money held under the transactions motive is, in fact, interest elastic. It therefore assumes that 
the expected gains and losses from holding interest-yielding assets is always zero and 
independent of the current level of interest. His article then introduces the concept of 
uncertainty under which individuals have to make decisions to either hold money or invest it. 
 To demonstrate his point, Tobin describes three types of investors: risk-lovers, who 
put their money all in bonds to maximize risk-return; plungers, who either invest all the way 
in bonds or in cash; and risk-averters who “will not be satisfied to accept more risk unless 
they can also expect greater expected return” (p. 69-70). According to Tobin, the majority of 
investors belong to the last category and are risk-averting, which brings him to a second 
critique on Keynes’ liquidity preference theory. Keynes’ model assumes that people hold their 
assets either all in cash or all in bonds, like plungers, which is an unrealistic assumption to 
Tobin. In line with his theory on risk-aversion, he argues that the majority of investors who 
face various risk and return options will diversify their wealth in a mixed portfolio of cash, 
shares, bonds, and other money market instruments. By diversifying their money they strike a 
balance between safe financial assets such as cash, that will neither impose risks nor returns, 
and riskier assets like bonds that “offer the investor the chance of large capital gains at the 
price of equivalent changes of large capital losses” (p. 72).  
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3.1.3 The Baumol inventory theoretic approach 
William Baumol (1952) interpreted the interest elasticity of the transactions demand for 
money from the perspective of cash balances held by individuals or firms. His theory intends 
to arrive at an ‘optimal cash balance’, in which the combined transactions cost and the cost of 
holding money are minimized. The inventory, or optimal cash balance, model has become 
known as the Baumol-Tobin model, dedicated to both Baumol and James Tobin who wrote an 
almost identical piece four years after Baumol’s publication. In a footnote Tobin 
acknowledged that “The importance of these costs [of transactions] in explaining the demand 
for cash has been explicitly analyzed by W.J. Baumol, (…), a paper which I should have read 
before writing this one but did not.” (Tobin, 1956). For simplicity reasons, this study refers to 
Baumol’s contribution. 
 Baumol distinguishes between two types of costs that arise from holding money in 
either cash or bonds: transaction cost and opportunity cost. The inventory approach suggests 
that an individual or a firm normally holds an inventory of cash because income and 
expenditure usually do not coincide, and because expenses are not always known beforehand. 
Having a large amount of cash is beneficial because the individual can make every transaction 
he wishes, while saving the cost of having to pay a fixed bank (or what Baumol calls a 
‘broker’s’) fee every time he withdraws or lends money, or has to liquidate bonds for cash 
(Baumol, 1952: 545-546). This is the transactions cost element. However, holding cash comes 
with opportunity cost. While a certain amount of ready money is beneficial to provide for 
(un)expected payments, it is expensive to hold excessive amounts of capital in the form of 
cash balances because the money could have been invested otherwise in the firm or in 
interest-bearing securities (bonds). Thus, the total costs of cash balances = transaction cost + 
opportunity cost. This can be written as:  
 
𝐶
2
𝑟 +  
𝑇
𝐶
𝐹 
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, where 𝐶 is the amount of cash raised by withdrawals or selling bonds; 
𝐶
2
 the average cash 
balance; 𝑟 the opportunity cost represented by the interest rate on bonds, which is a 
decreasing function of the cash balance; 𝑇 the total cash needed to make transactions;  
𝑇
𝐶
  the 
number of transactions; and 𝐹 the transaction cost of withdrawing or borrowing cash, which 
increases with the number of transaction  
𝑇
𝐶
 .   
  
Figure 9 illustrates that - in deciding on the level of cash balances - individuals or firms will 
face a trade-off between the transactions costs of having to go to the bank, with the 
opportunity cost of foregone interest on holding money. Individuals will therefore pick a level 
that minimizes the total costs of holding money. The trade-off can be written as:  
 
𝐶∗ =  √
2𝐹𝑇
𝑟
 
, where C* represents the optimal cash balance. 
 
3.2 The motives for holding international reserves  
Monetary authorities can have several reasons for holding international currency and, by 
definition, these motives are not mutually exclusive (Cooper, 1970). Nonetheless, Keynes’ 
conventional identification of the three motives behind liquidity preference can be applied, to 
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a broad extent, to the demand for international reserves. 
  
3.2.1 Transactions motive and balance of payments financing 
In the tradition of classical economic views on the demand for money, the early literature 
typically explained the demand for international reserves exclusively in terms of what 
monetary authorities need to finance short-term balance of payments deficits. According to 
Stockholm School economist Bent Hansen, the international reserves held for transactions 
purposes could be seen as a central bank’s working balance used to meet temporary 
inconsistencies in foreign receipts and international payments made by the state. Hansen 
argued that this working balance would increase in proportion to the growth of national 
income, the volume of trade and other economic fundamentals (Hansen, 1962). This single 
view on the transactions motive for international reserves was contested in later research, 
because it seemed to suggest that central banks actively engage in the financing of 
international transactions (Heller, 1966). In fact, in a free-market setting the transactions 
demand for international payments is mainly exercised by commercial banks. The role and 
influence of the central bank is negligible, even though it must guard itself against market 
fluctuations just like any private party does. In this respect, we can say that international 
reserves are only held by central banks for precautionary reasons (Beaufort Wijnholds, 1977: 
92-93).   
 
3.2.2 Precautionary motives and self-insurance 
The second motive holds that the holding of international reserves, as noted early on by 
Keynes (1936),  “depends on (…) the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of a 
certain proportion of total resources;” (p. 170). Keeping a higher amount of international 
reserves allows a country to ‘buy time’ in case of economic shocks and thereby lowers the 
probability of a crisis. This self-insurance, or precautionary, motive suggests that the main 
purpose of accumulating reserves is to fill up the national ‘war chest’, which can be used by 
central banks as a hedge against international liquidity shortages, trade imbalances and other 
exogenous shocks (Baltensperger, 1974; Rodrik, 2006; Park, 2008; Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-
Kung, 2013). In the early 1990s studies already pointed at the use of international reserves to 
stabilize output and to curb costly sovereign defaults, particularly for export-dependent 
economies like China which are typically prone to economic swings (Ben-Bassat and 
Gottlieb, 1992). The impact of their observations was limited, however, in the relatively 
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buoyant economic situation of the nineties.  
 The experiences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis gave a new impetus to the reserve 
adequacy debate and increased the focus on self-insurance. The increased risk of capital 
market stops as witnessed during the ‘Asian contagion’ caught many observers by surprise 
(Aizenman and Marion 2003). The IMF responded in orthodox ways, forcing Asian countries 
that were in trouble to cut government spending and raise interest rates to prevent capital 
flight. These measures had adverse effects and further devastated Asia’s already fragile 
economic situation. Asian countries concluded that they never again be put in the situation of 
having to ask the IMF for support, and subsequently decided to accumulate large international 
reserves that would provide a buffer in case of another crisis (Allen and Hong, 2011). 
Discussions in the academic literature started to focus on the post-crisis prevention measures 
taken by Asian central banks and other authorities to hedge against sudden liquidity stops 
(Calvo 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 2000). Triggered by these discussions, policy papers by the 
IMF more and more emphasized the relationship between short-term external debt and 
currency crises, suggesting that accumulating foreign reserves could be considered a 
precautionary requirement for countries that regularly experience (temporary) impaired access 
to capital markets (Calvo and Reinhart 2000; Edwards 2004).  
 The IMF subsequently started to issue policy recommendations that encouraged the 
use of the standard ratios applied in the previous section of this study in order to determine the 
precautionary level in relation to a particular country’s external vulnerabilities, such as the 
ratio of reserves to total imports (Triffin, 1947; 1960), reserves to the domestic money supply 
(Johnson, 1968) and the size of reserve holdings relative to a country’s external liabilities 
(Brown, 1964). Most of these rules of thumb and ratios had been around since Bretton Woods 
and were reformatted by the IMF to fit the needs and characteristics of developing countries - 
and crisis-ridden Asia in particular. For instance, a modified version of the reserves-to-debt 
ratio came to be known as the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, which states that the size of liquid 
reserves for developing countries must be equal to its short-term external debt coming due 
within one year (while this used to be three months in the original set-up) (Greenspan, 1999). 
This simple metric of reserves to external short-term debt was long used as a main indicator in 
IMF Article IV country reports during the 2000s (Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001; 
Banerji and Martinez, 2012).  
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3.2.3 Speculative motives and monetary mercantilism 
Consistent with Keynes’ speculative liquidity preference, a third motive for holding 
international reserves is that countries can use it for speculative reasons. They can use 
reserves to control exchange rates and invest overseas in high risk-return and strategic assets, 
as well as other operations that aim to stimulate domestic growth. On this side of the table we 
find observers who argue that the surge in foreign exchange reserves in recent years, 
especially by emerging Asia, has little to do with precautionary reasons but is motivated by 
the region’s overreliance on exports and FDI. The literature refers to this as mercantilist (or 
export-promoting) motives (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004; Aizenman and Lee, 
2007, 2008; Park and Estrada, 2009; Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones, 2009; Bonatti and 
Fracasso, 2013). According to this approach, the hoarding of international reserves by many 
developing countries represents a modern version of ‘monetary mercantilism’, reminiscent of 
the economic theory and practice common in 18th century Europe (Aizenman and Lee, 2008). 
The principle question in the literature on the mercantilist motive is whether reserve holdings 
are ‘excessive’, in that they surpass levels that are deemed necessary for normal 
macroeconomic adjustment. It is assumed then that these excess amounts are the result of 
export-promoting policies or serve as collateral for encouraging FDI (Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Loo-Kung, 2013. 
 A contemporary version of the mercantilist approach argues that exchange rate 
intervention to maintain undervalued exchange rates can in fact be a rational and sustainable 
development strategy. According to this view, the accumulation of reserves by emerging 
economies serves as collateral which is being used to attract foreign investment – mainly in 
the light of the co-dependent relationship between the United States and the PRC (Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau & Garber, 2004; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013). The authors argue that the 
wide-scale market interventions by EMDCs that have their currencies pegged to the dollar is 
characteristic of a stable global monetary regime, which is in many ways a contemporary 
version of the original Bretton Woods regime. Within this ‘revived’ Bretton Woods system, 
also called ‘Bretton Woods II’, the United States serves as the asymmetric centre (by running 
current account deficits) and emerging markets as the periphery, by serving as dollar peggers 
and accumulators (Dellas and Tavlas 2011; Hall and Tavlas 2013) .   
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3.3 The welfare economic approach 
The welfare economic approach to the demand for reserves was developed in the 1960s by 
IMF-economist Marcus Fleming. The welfare approach considers the potential effects of the 
increase in global reserves on world economic welfare, in which “[international] liquidity is 
optimal if no change having a desirable effect on economic welfare can take place” (Fleming, 
1961). It explicitly looks at the growth of international reserves in terms of its effect on policy 
objectives, “given the probable reactions of governments, central banks, and individuals of 
increasing total reserves or rates of reserve growth, the increases being distributed among 
countries in some specified way” (Fleming, 1967). The methodology used by Fleming is 
basically a cost-benefit analysis in which the positive effects of further increases in reserves - 
in the form of trade liberalization, higher global employment or even the willingness to 
provide foreign aid - are contrasted with the potential negative effects, such as imbalanced 
trade relations or inflation. This trade-off results in a global optimal rate of the growth of 
reserves. 
 An often-heard critique on Fleming’s methodology is that it presents a rather static and 
mathematical approach to determine the optimal stock of international reserves, which “must 
(…) be determined at dynamic and administrative levels – and not at the level of static 
welfare theory” (Little, 1957: 184). Another problematic feature of the welfare economic 
approach is that it only considers welfare effects on a global level and is therefore unsuitable 
to be applied to individual countries or country groups. Fleming acknowledged this and in his 
work he attempted to estimate national optima in relation to policy objectives on the country-
level but finds that the effects of reserve growth  (and reserve levels) will always, to a greater 
or lesser extent, be internationally distributed. He also finds that the effects can be 
‘abnormally maldistributed’ among countries, in the sense that temporary fluctuations in 
economic fundamentals of an individual country can significantly distort the welfare analysis. 
His solution then is to scale up the effects of policies on the country-level, so “they can be 
aggregated, subject to an adjustment to be mentioned below, to provide an estimate of the 
global optimal rate of reserve growth”. (Fleming, 1967). Unfortunately, this solution does not 
solve the applicability problem to single countries.  
  
3.4 Theory of optimal international reserves  
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In managing a country’s foreign reserves, a central bank is essentially responsible for two 
aspects: deciding upon the desired amount of reserves and the currency composition of the 
reserve portfolio (Roger, 1993). The literature on international reserves has traditionally been 
separated between these two aspects and regards the level of foreign reserves and their 
portfolio allocation as independent decisions (Beck and Weber, 2011). While recent research 
indicates that the adequate diversification of the portfolio over different currencies may be as 
critical as the level of international reserves, in particular for large(r) reserve holders like 
China (Beck and Rahbari, 2008; Beck and Weber, 2011; Yu and Gao, 2011; Zhang et al., 
2015), this aspect is less studied and falls outside the scope of this thesis. The second, more 
prominent, aspect of reserve management is the notion of optimal reserve levels – or which 
level provides an optimal balance between the benefit (of being able to utilize the reserve 
stock for macroeconomic adjustment) and the costs of holding reserves. 
 The theory of optimal reserve levels was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
under the umbrella of the IMF, most notably by Robert Heller (1966) and complemented by 
economists like Clark (1970), Kelly (1970) and Flanders (1971). The examination of the 
demand for reserves in terms of a cost-benefit analysis is essentially an elaboration of the 
welfare economic approach, but the analysis has a dynamic component and can be applied to 
individual countries (and country groups) rather than to the world at large (Beaufort 
Wijnholds, 1977: 99-100). Inspired on Baumol’s inventory model, optimal reserve theory 
suggests there is a trade-off between transaction cost (which, in macroeconomic terms, refers 
to the cost of adjustment) and opportunity cost. In deciding on an optimal level of 
international reserves, a country’s monetary authority will therefore balance the potential cost 
33 
 
of economic adjustment that would arise in case reserves are exhausted, with the opportunity 
cost of holding those reserves. 
 Figure 10 depicts the Baumol inventory model redesigned in terms of the demand for 
international reserves. In the macroeconomic application, transaction cost is replaced by the 
cost of adjustment. For practical reasons, the opportunity cost of holding reserves is usually 
measured in terms of the interest rate differentials on capital, which is the difference between 
the average yield on reserves and the marginal productivity of alternative investments (usually 
proxied by the value of short-term deposit rates). It is difficult to measure other, economic and 
social, costs. While this study uses a similar, limited, approach to the opportunity cost 
structure, it recognizes that there are broader economic costs to reserve accumulation 
(inflation, interest rate pressures) that should be kept in mind.  
 
3.4.1 The benefit of holding reserves 
As noted by Clark (1970), “the benefit derived from holding reserves is [essentially] the 
avoidance of the costs of adjustment” (Clark, 1970). In other words, it represents the national 
income that would have been lost to pay for balance of payment deficits and other 
macroeconomic issues, may it not be financed out of reserve holdings. The cost-benefit 
approach introduced by Heller (1966) measures the cost of adjustment only in limited terms 
for what he calls ‘expenditure-changing policies’, because of difficulties in quantifying other 
potential determinants (p. 297). However, over the years the literature has related the cost of 
adjustment to more financial-economic categories and developed proxies to measure the 
impact of these factors. These include the following categories:  
* Economic size. In theory, since the volume of a country’s international transactions tends to 
increase with economic size so does its demand for international reserves. The literature uses 
GDP, GDP per capita and population size as proxies.  
* Balance of payments. The balance of payments records an economy’s transactions with the 
rest of the world and can be divided into the capital/financial account and the current account.  
 Indicators for capital account vulnerability include the supply of money (M2), FDI, 
(short-term) external debt and other measures and indices of financial openness or 
globalization. The capital account becomes more vulnerable in the face of financial openness 
because it will increase the potential for residential capital flight from the domestic currency. 
In other words, a higher degree of financial openness is associated with higher crisis 
vulnerability and will encourage monetary authorities to hold more reserves.  
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 Likewise, a high degree of current account (trade) openness exposes the domestic 
economy to external shocks from exports and will increase reserves held for precautionary 
reasons. For similar reasons, an increase in imports is generally expected to increase a 
country’s demand for international reserves.  
* Exchange rate flexibility. Theoretically, greater flexibility/volatility of the domestic 
exchange rate is associated with falling demand for foreign exchange reserves because central 
banks have to purchase less to fix exchange rates. 
 
3.3.2 Opportunity cost 
In economic terms, holding exchange reserves in excess of what is necessary to cover 
macroeconomic adjustment reduces allocative efficiency. It reduces welfare by definition 
because the marginal cost of holding an additional unit of foreign-denominated currency is 
higher than the marginal benefit - of spending it in domestic outlets, or investing it in less 
liquid but higher rate-of-return assets. From the previous analysis, we can deduct that the cost 
of sterilizing reserves is roughly equal to the interest paid on (government and central bank) 
debt issued by the central bank, minus the interest that is earned over its foreign reserves. 
Reserves are typically invested in liquid but low-yielding securities such as short- and 
medium-term US Treasuries. As Dani Rodrik noted in a 2006 paper, “Holding high reserves 
is the price to be paid for not managing the capital account more actively (…), involving a 
“(…) trade-off between ﬁnancial globalization and avoiding the cost of high levels of 
reserves”. She estimates the opportunity cost for developing countries of holding reserves in a 
traditional central bank portfolio (invested in short-term government bonds and money market 
instruments) to be around 1 percent of GDP (Rodrik, 2006). Rodrik dubbed this the ‘social 
cost of self-insurance’: the opportunity cost for a country investing reserves is equal to the 
costs of external borrowing by that same country.  
     
4 A survey of the empirical literature 
This section will explore how the theoretical framework for optimal reserve levels has 
evolved since the sixties and how these theoretical considerations have been translated into 
analytical and empirical approaches towards modelling the demand for international reserves. 
Following the discussion of the literature in the first two paragraphs, paragraph 4.3 will 
summarize the variables that have been developed in empirical work as proxies for the cost of 
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adjustment identified in the theory of optimal reserve levels. Paragraph 4.4 will review the, 
still scarce, empirical literature focusing on China.  
 
4.1 Optimal reserves and the buffer-stock inventory model 
Early empirical studies on the demand and management of reserve holdings are limited 
(Grubel, 1971). Much of the quantitative work has been built on the initial line of theory 
developed in the late 1960s, concerned with the demand for international currency and reserve 
level optimization. Heller (1966) was among the first to quantify optimal reserve levels on the 
basis of the cost-benefit inventory approach. He noted that international reserves must fulfil 
two criteria in order to be suitable as an economic measurement. In the first place, “they must 
be acceptable at all times to foreign economic units for payment of financial obligations”, and 
secondly, “their value, expressed in foreign units of account, should be known with certainty” 
(pp. 296-297). According to Heller’s criteria, international reserves are comprised of gold 
holdings, official convertible foreign exchange, SDRs and reserve positions (unconditional 
drawing rights) within the IMF.  
 The first reserve-demand models developed by Heller, Clark (1970), Kelly (1970) and 
Flanders (1971) to assess the benefits and costs of holding international reserves were so-
called ‘buffer-stock’ models. Consistent with the theory of optimal reserves, the buffer-stock 
approach assumes that when determining optimal levels a monetary authority will balance the 
costs of adjustment in case reserves are exhausted (the ‘buffer’) with the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves (stock). The buffer-stock model represented a fairly stable formula of a 
nation’s current account vulnerability and opportunity cost. Overall, the empirical literature of 
the 1970s-80s demonstrated the explanatory power of the traditional buffer-stock model and 
expanded the model with proxies for other determinants, such as exchange rate flexibility, 
GDP, population growth and import volatility (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981; Edwards, 1983, 
1985; Frenkel, 1983; Lizondo and Mathieson, 1987).  
 The globalization of financial markets starting in the 1990s and the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis led to a revision of the traditional buffer-stock model. A collection 
of influential papers in the late 1990s and early 2000s had raised doubts about the explanatory 
power of the model in case reserve holdings would vary across time and country. 
Furthermore, the traditional models seemed to perform badly in accounting for and explaining 
the surge of reserve holdings by EMDCs and their interconnectedness with the global 
economy (Flood and Marion, 2002; Edison, 2003). Opportunity cost in particular proved 
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difficult to measure due to inconsistencies in the costs of depleting and replenishing reserves, 
all the more so because many developing countries did not have market-oriented interest rates 
until the 1990s (and some, like China, still have not). This often led to insignificant results 
causing many authors to exclude opportunity cost from the analysis (Edwards, 1985). These 
findings led, inter alia, to a search for new analytical and empirical frameworks which were 
able to account for the globalization of financial markets and the growing role of developing 
countries in global finance and trade.  
 Since the 2000s, a growing number of studies have attempted to theoretically model 
and empirically estimate optimal reserve levels for developing countries and EMEs. In 
determining the relationship between reserve holdings and economic determinants, these 
studies largely depend on aggregated country data under the assumption that reserve levels 
adjust to long-run equilibrium (Lane and Burke, 2001; Aizenman and Marion, 2003, 2004; 
Edison, 2003; Mendoza, 2004; Jeanne and Rancière, 2008; Park and Estrada, 2009). The 
recent literature takes better account of the multidimensionality of exchange rate fluctuations, 
as well as the increasing exposure of emerging markets to financial turmoil (Hawkins and 
Turner 2000). The empirical work followed in tandem with the debate on the role of foreign 
exchange reserves in the rapid economic development of the traditional South in the 1990s 
and the Asian financial crisis, where large holdings were either seen as a hedge against 
economic shocks (self-insurance motive) or as a stimulant for exports and thus economic 
growth (mercantilist motive).   
 
4.2 Extensions to the inventory model 
 
4.2.1 The self-insurance conundrum 
A considerable branch of the empirical literature has attempted to put flesh on the bones of 
the self-insurance approach to the demand for international reserves. The findings from these 
studies provided valuable input for the IMF and fed the changing perception on the role of 
reserves as a stabilizing tool in case of sudden liquidity stops and financial crises. Early 
publications were relatively simple and informal examinations in which reserve levels were 
measured against the rules of thumb mentioned earlier in this study, such as the ratio of 
reserves to imports and exports, broad money (M2) and short-term external debt (that is, the 
Guidotti-Greenspan rule of thumb). The simple rules of thumb were often contested in the 
literature and ignored by countries that were expected to apply them. The experiences of the 
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1997 crisis and the devastating economic effects caused by IMF regulations were still fresh in 
the minds of Asian policy-makers, which provided an argument to change the perceptions on 
crisis prevention. Triggered by these arguments, later recommendations by the IMF 
emphasized that the use of single and constant benchmarks was not sufficient to determine 
reserve levels and should only be a starting point for further analysis - taking into account 
country-specific characteristics such as economic size, exchange rate regimes and the 
opportunity cost a country would have to incur for holding additional reserves (IMF 2011). 
  These recommendations paved the way for more rigorous empirical work taking hold 
of multiple economic indicators. The rather informal examinations of the rules of thumb 
quickly evolved into the use of econometric models to assess the adequacy of reserve 
holdings in terms of its precautionary function. Many of those empirical studies were 
performed in the 2000s in response to the experiences of the Asian financial crisis, and later to 
the global crisis that started in 2007. A publication by the research department of the Bank of 
Chile formalized the output stabilizing argument in an analytical framework measuring the 
effect of foreign exchange reserves relative to short-term debt and the probability of a crisis. 
The authors concluded that the international reserve-to-debt ratios were consistent with 
optimal precautionary levels in the light of the potential costs of a crisis (Garcia and Soto, 
2004). Another landmark study was by Dani Rodrik (2006), who’s arguments are in favour of 
self-insurance but shows the social cost of holding reserves. Rodrik’s paper fits in a long line 
of the academic literature which propagate the use of international reserves for precautionary 
purposes (Beck and Rahbari, 2008; Beck and Weber, 2011; Gallagher and Shrestha, 2012). 
 IMF-adviser Joshua Aizenman has been responsible for most of the (IMF-affiliated) 
output in support of the self-insurance motive. Using a comprehensive data sample of 125 
developing countries, Aizenman and Marion (2003) show that reserve levels until 1996 
corresponded well with the predicted outcomes of key determinants such as exchange rate 
flexibility, the size of international transactions and political factors. For the period following 
the Asian crisis their estimations began to structurally under-predict reserve holdings for East-
Asian countries, suggesting that precautionary motives are the main cause of the rise in 
reserve holdings. In a later article, the conventional econometric specification for international 
reserves is augmented with variables associated with mercantilist and precautionary demand 
approaches, represented by crises dummies. While the variables are statistically significant for 
both approaches, the ones that represent self-insurance purposes play a greater economic role 
in accounting for the trend of growing international reserves in East-Asia (Aizenman and Lee, 
2007; 2008).  
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 Aizenman and his cohorts tested the robustness of their findings in later articles, 
expanding the model with variables that represent political aspects (Aizenman and Marion, 
2004). The authors suggest that reserves are primarily held to hedge against external shocks, 
but the optimal size may be reduced by political factors such as corruption, low democracy 
scores and political instability (Aizenman and Marion, 2004). They also validated the self-
insurance motive for the case of South-Korea (Aizenman, Lee and Rhee, 2007). Overall, the 
authors conclude that the empirical results are robust and support precautionary motives. In 
addition, Aizenman (2011) performed a similar analysis after the recent global financial crisis 
to demonstrate how developing countries, unlike many countries in the West, were able to 
benefit from their precautionary reserve pool to support their currencies and deleverage their 
domestic private sectors.  
 
4.2.2 Evidence for monetary mercantilism 
At the same time, a counter-movement in research attempted to find empirical evidence for 
the mercantilist motive in accumulating reserves. Recall that the main question in the 
theoretical literature on the mercantilist argument is whether countries hold excess reserves 
that go beyond the amount that is needed to guard the economy against economic shocks, 
drops in global demand or an unforeseen drying-up of foreign lending.  
39 
 
One branch of empirical work tries to answer this question by simply looking at whether real 
reserve holdings over the years tend to comply with basic rules of thumb (Bussière and 
Mulder, 1999; Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001). Larry Summers (2006) presented a 
measure on global reserves of emerging markets as a whole during a lecture at the Reserve 
Bank of India, looking at whether the Guidotti-Greenspan rule has historically been a 
guideline for the size of reserve holdings. Summer’s main conclusion is that reserve levels for 
EMEs have far exceeded the 1-year short-term debt rule since 1990 (figure 11). In similar 
attempts, Jeanne and Rancière (2008) and Jeanne (2007) estimated optimal reserve levels in 
relation to the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, using a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. The 
theoretical basis of their model consists of a trade-off between domestic consumption-
smoothing in case of a sudden stop and the cost of carrying reserves. In line with Summers’ 
observation, they found that reserve holdings have been excessive and in some cases 
multiples of the IMF’s precautionary prescription based on the conventional rules of thumb.  
 In addition to the previous, relatively simple and informal, examples, the dilemma of 
excess reserves is tested in more rigorous regression analyses. A landmark study in this 
respect appeared in the September edition of the 2003 World Economic Outlook. IMF 
researcher Hali Edison (2003) provided a methodology in which a country’s reserves are 
related to a limited set of variables which are believed to determine reserve demand. The 
analysis employed in her essay, entitled “Are Foreign Exchange Reserves in Asia Too 
High?”, depends on five categories of variables: economic size, the capital account, the 
current account, trade openness (measured by exchange rate flexibility) and opportunity cost.2 
Edison’s specification combines the traditional rules of thumb and macroeconomic 
fundamentals identified in earlier work by authors like Robert Heller (1966), Heller and Khan 
(1978), Edwards (1983, 1985) and Lizondo and Mathieson (1987). The model is estimated 
using a large panel covering 122 developing countries with annual data for the period 1980-
1996 and is able to explain around 90 percent of the variation in reserve holdings by emerging 
markets. The findings suggest that most emerging economies in Asia have built up reserves in 
the 2000s that are well in excess of what can be expected based on economic fundamentals. 
Moreover, Edison finds that the growth of GDP per capita, Asia’s population, import 
propensity and the volatility of the exchange rate are significant drivers of Asia’s reserves.  
 Edison’s model was replicated and refined in a large number of follow-up papers 
(Park and Estrada, 2009; Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil, 2009; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 
                                                          
2 The specification by Edison (2003) is the basic model framework used for the analysis in this thesis. 
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2010). Notable are Gosselin and Parent (2005) who perform a cointegration analysis arriving 
at a long-run reserve-demand function for a panel of eight Asian economies (China, India, 
Indonesia, South-Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore). The authors 
control for the Asian financial crisis and other structural breaks by running separate 
regressions. They find that reserve levels in Asia were positively related to the ratio of broad 
money to GDP, imports to GDP and exchange rate volatility prior to the Asian financial crisis. 
In the period following the crisis, current account developments such as increases in the 
volatility of imports and exports start to play a less important role in the decision to hold more 
reserves, while the coefficient associated with the broad money supply (m2) increases. The 
authors conclude that increasing financial globalization since the 2000s has put more weight 
on financial openness (and thus the risk of capital flight and sudden financial stops) and less 
weight on trade openness in determining the size of reserve holdings in Asia.  
 
4.3 Summary of categories and variables  
Table 1 summarizes the categories and associated variables which have been identified and 
used in the empirical literature since Heller (1966). The use of the original (macro)economic 
determinants that affect the cost of adjustment has been fairly stable in the literature. We can 
see that the inventory specification has not changed dramatically since the 1960s, apart from 
the addition of variables that control for political factors, financial development, 
globalization, financial openness and other proxies that may capture the changing patterns of 
reserve holdings and the higher exposure of developing countries to short-term capital 
inflows.  
 
TABLE 1  
Determinants 
Categories Variables 
Foreign exchange reserves -  Real foreign reserves, including or minus gold 
-  Ratio of reserves to GDP 
Economic Size - GDP, per capita GDP 
- Population size 
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Balance of Payments 
           Capital Account 
 
 
- Capital account balance 
- (Short-term) external debt ratios 
- Money supply: M1 and/or broad money M2/M3 to 
GDP 
- FDI in total output 
            Current Account - Current account balance 
- Share of imports and exports in GDP 
- Other measures of trade openness and globalization 
Exchange Rate Flexibility exchange rate volatility  
Opportunity cost  Interest rate differentials 
Political factors - (Political and civil) freedom indices 
- Corruption indices 
- Measures of political stability  
 
Whereas the choice of variables has not changed much, the empirical methods have. We have 
seen that recent studies increasingly rely on panel data and error correction models and are 
thus able to capture the fixed and long-term effects of changes in fundamentals on reserve 
demand and policy (Gosselin and Parent, 2005; Prabheesh, Malathy and Madhumati, 2007; 
Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones, 2009; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2010). 
 
4.4 Empirical studies on China 
Compared to the rich empirical literature on the Asian region as a whole, econometric studies 
which focus exclusively on China’s reserve demand are few. Despite the growing interest in 
China’s monetary affairs in recent years, China’s unique experience of central planning and 
rapid market transition seems to be difficult to capture in the traditional models from which 
most have a long tradition in more advanced market economies. Furthermore, historical data 
on China’s economy are frequently unreliable, unavailable, of low quality or too short for a 
proper analysis (Ford and Huang, 1994). The lack of proper data presents an obstacle when 
determining the dynamics of reserve holdings over time, relative to the rapidly changing 
economic conditions in the PRC. Another factor is that capital flows in China had been fairly 
one-dimensional until the 2000s. The country has experienced huge inflows of FDI which are 
viewed as being driven by economic fundamentals, potentially influencing any further 
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analysis of the dramatic increase in foreign exchange reserves (Prasad and Wei, 2005).  
 Nevertheless, the reserve adequacy literature focusing solely on China started to 
emerge in the mid-1990s in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’. The first 
comprehensive quantitative studies came from Hong Kong universities (Ford and Huang, 
1994; Huang, 1995). The authors argued that despite the obstacles mentioned previously, 
most importantly the unique composition of China’s economic and growth model, there is no 
apparent reason to believe that reserve holdings should be determined differently from other 
countries. Following the methodology of Elbadawi (1988) who had composed a reserve 
demand model of labour-exporting countries based on the Sudan, their papers employ error 
correction models to assess China’s long-run demand for reserves for the period 1950-1990 
and 1980Q1-1990Q4, respectively. Both studies suggest that there is a significant and stable 
relationship between China’s reserve holdings and the traditional economic determinants of 
the inventory model. Overall, the authors conclude that the long-run demand has been 
influenced mainly by precautionary motives. Furthermore, their analyses indicate that the 
authorities have the ability to adjust deviations from the desired level of reserves, suggesting 
that reserve management has high priority in China. 
 However, in contrast to the general perception in economic theory Huang (1995) finds 
that Chinese reserve levels are negatively related to imports and the money supply (M2). A 
possible explanation given by the authors is that, up until the 1990s, China’s foreign exchange 
reserves were strictly allocated by the state. Domestic enterprises (which, at that time, were 
mostly state-owned) needing foreign exchange for international transactions had to buy it 
from the state for imports, and sell it immediately after exporting. The government has 
maintained a policy of foreign exchange retention since the 1980s under which enterprises can 
retain a share of their reserves in quotas. When they need to import enterprises no longer have 
to opt for government allocation, although companies are still not allowed to use reserves 
beyond their quotas and the unused capital still remains in the hands of SAFE (Hu, 2010). A 
possible implication of this system with measuring reserves is that scalar variables (such as 
GDP, imports and the money supply) move in the opposite direction from reserve holdings – 
an increase in imports literally leads to an outflow of foreign exchange reserves, and vice 
versa (Ford and Huang, 1994; Huang 1995).  
 Consistent with the rise of the new mercantilist literature, some studies focus on 
whether Chinese reserve holdings are ‘excessive’, particularly in the face of the ‘Sino-
American co-dependency’ view discussed in section 2. The empirical evidence from these 
studies suggests that China, in contrast to its Asian neighbours after the global financial crisis, 
43 
 
has stuck to a policy of ‘exchange rate mercantilism’ in which it structurally finances 
American deficits to maintain high exports (Patnaik et al., 2011; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013; 
Zhang et al. 2015). Research has also attempted to show that reserve accumulation not only 
causes distortions in the global exchange and trading markets, but also has negative effects on 
the Chinese economy. For instance, Frankel (2004) estimates the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves and concludes that China is paying more to foreign investors investing in China than 
it receives in returns on its foreign exchange reserves. As previously mentioned, similar 
attempts were made by Rodrik (2006) who estimated that the opportunity cost on reserve 
holdings for the average EMDC amounts to 1 percent of the country’s GDP.  
 The recent literature on China’s reserve demand is now mainly coming from 
universities on the Chinese mainland. These studies are surprisingly critical and tend to 
confirm the story told by the rules of thumb of reserve adequacy that China’s current build-up 
has exceeded its optimal level – although studies vary about how excessive it is (Chen et al. 
2007). More specifically, the literature generally finds that China’s reserves began to exceed 
optimal levels around the start of the millennium (Chen and Lei, 2012; Chen and Zou; Li and 
Tian, 2016). Mainland studies also find a structural increase of foreign reserves in the post-
1997 period, which goes hand in hand with a greater emphasis on precautionary reserves in 
the aftermath of the Asian Financial crisis and the start of the reserve build-up in East-Asia. 
All things considered, the overall balance of evidence suggests that the ‘Chinese experience’ 
in in many ways similar to that of other EMEs and should be regarded as such. However, 
some studies indicate that there are several factors related to China’s former system of 
planned economy and rapid market transition which impact the demand for reserves 
differently and may lead to divergent empirical results. 
 
5 Empirical analysis 
 
The following section will introduce a reserve-demand model for the PRC. The proposed 
model will attempt to quantify the factors that may have had an influence on the demand for 
foreign exchanges reserves in China since the start of reforms in 1978. The results section 5.4 
will attempt to relate the empirical dynamics of China’s demand for international reserves to 
the premises about its politico-economic model formulated in section 2 of this thesis. 
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5.2 Data and data management 
The empirical analysis in this study relies on macro-level data for a number of economic 
fundamentals of the Chinese economy, including GDP per capita, current and capital account 
ratios, exchange and interest rates. The data were obtained from different sources. The rate of 
foreign exchange reserves was retrieved from the official website of China’s SAFE and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Values of per capita GDP and the money 
supply (M2) were calculated from the World Bank and OECD national accounts data. GDP 
per capita is expressed in current US dollars and calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World 
Bank website). Data on population size, the current-/capital account and exchange rates were 
provided by China Data Online, a comprehensive database run by the China Data Center at 
the University of Michigan which collects and publishes official data on China from the 
PBoC, SAFE and other (public) institutions. The China Data Center is a constituent unit of 
the university and was established in 1997 to promote the use and distribution of data on 
China for educational and research purposes. Where necessary, the information on variables 
related to China’s historical balance of payments and currency exchange rates was 
supplemented by other data sources, including the World Bank Development Indicators, IMF 
(IFS and cross-country statistics) and the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve 
System. Finally, the interest rates on US Treasury bills and the Chinese deposit rate, needed to 
calculate the opportunity cost, were retrieved from the US Department of the Treasury and 
SAFE, respectively.  
 The dataset has several limitations that may impact the quality of the analysis and the 
overall explanatory power of the model. Similar to the experiences of Ford and Huang (1994) 
and other researchers, finding appropriate time-series data for China proved troublesome. 
Reliable information on government debt, short-term liabilities and political factors was either 
unavailable or of low quality. If available, only data provided since the 1980s seemed 
coherent to use for econometric analysis but nevertheless had to be compiled from different 
sources. Early series were merely available on an annual basis and quarterly data from before 
1995 were scarce. Such a short time-span would significantly diminish the explanatory power 
of the model with regard to China’s long-term economic development. For this reason, the 
subsequent analysis will rely on annual data on a limited set of (macro)economic variables 
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only, stretching a period of 37 years (1978 to 2015).  
 
5.2 Variables  
5.2.1 Variable specification 
 
TABLE 2 
Variable specification 
 
 
Economic Category Variable(s) Measure/details Abbreviation 
Foreign exchange 
reserves 
International reserves Official holdings, SDRs and 
reserve positions, percentage 
of GDP, log 
  
fex                            
Economic size - Per capita GDP 
- Population size  
Current US$, no deductions, 
log  
gdp 
pop 
Capital and financial  
accounts 
- Capital account balance 
- Broad money (M2) 
- FDI 
Real value, US$ 
Percentage of GDP, log 
Percentage of GDP, log 
cabal 
m2 
fdi 
Current Account  - Current account balance 
- Share of imports 
- Share of exports  
Real value, US$ 
Percentage of GDP, log 
Percentage of GDP, log 
cubal 
import 
export 
Exchange Rate 
Flexibility 
Volatility of the exchange 
rate 
Standard deviation of the 
RMB-US dollar exchange 
rate), annualized from 
monthly data, log 
xrt 
Opportunity cost  Interest rate differential 
 
Yield on reserves (3-month 
US treasury bill) minus 
domestic capital (3-month 
deposit rate) 
occ 
Notes: All series in logarithms except current account balance (cubal), capital account balance (cabal) and 
interest rate differential (occ). The value of these variables is equal to 0 for a number of observed years, which, 
when logged, would be excluded from the analysis. This would reduce the explanatory power of the model with 
regard to China’s long-term economic fundamentals.  
 
5.2.2 Hypotheses 
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* Economic size. Since the volume of a country’s international transactions increases with 
economic size, reserve levels tend to rise with GDP (per capita) and population. These 
variables are therefore expected to be positively associated with reserve demand.   
* Capital account: Exchange rate intervention by China’s monetary authorities may reverse 
the normally positive relationship between the broad money supply and the level of reserves. 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the PBoC has to print RMB in order to buy US dollars 
and other foreign currency. The central bank then sterilizes reserves in order to normalize the 
monetary base and counteract increases of net foreign reserves. Considering the large-scale 
exchange interventions by China, this study hypothesizes that an increase in the broad money 
supply will lead to a reduction of the size of China’s international reserves. 
* Current account: A rise in China’s exports is expected to increase the PBoC’s demand for 
reserves, because it further exposes the domestic economy to external shocks. In line with the 
findings from previous empirical work on China (Ford and Huang, 1994; 1995), this study 
hypothesizes that imports are negatively associated with the size of reserve holdings. From a 
textbook economics perspective, a country has to pay imports in another currency and will 
drain its foreign reserves to provide those payments. It was mentioned earlier that this is a 
rather deprecated view when looking at free-market economies, which assumes that states are 
still involved in the financing of international trade. However, under planned economy the 
Chinese government traditionally had full control over cross-border transactions and the 
allocation of foreign exchange. Companies had to purchase foreign currency directly from the 
state for imports, and sell it immediately after exporting. While controls have been relaxed 
over time in both de jure and de facto terms, the Chinese government has kept a firm grip on 
the reserves in circulation.  
* Exchange rate flexibility. Greater exchange rate volatility is generally associated with 
falling international reserves, because it reduces the need for central banks to buy foreign 
currency to peg exchange rates. Despite the fact that the PRC has de jure adopted a more 
market-oriented exchange rate regime, the literature has warned for what is called a ‘fear of 
floating’ where countries de facto do not allow the exchange rate to float (Calvo, 2002). For 
this reason, flexibility is usually measured by the real-time volatility of the exchange rate. 
Considering the PBoC’s historical and current practice of currency intervention, this study 
hypothesizes that greater volatility will trigger a fear of floating in policy-makers, resulting in 
increasing demand for international reserves. 
* Opportunity cost of capital. In theory, the higher the interest rate differential the less a 
monetary authority is willing to hold reserves, because the costs outweigh the benefits of 
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having foreign reserves in the portfolio. China’s reserves are mostly dollar-denominated or 
invested in currency assets from other advanced economies. Since interest rates in in these 
countries stand at an all-time low from easing monetary policy, the opportunity cost 
associated with holding reserves in these assets has increased in recent years. Considering the 
size and composition of China’s reserve portfolio, an increase in opportunity cost is expected 
to decrease the demand for international reserves. 
 
5.3 Empirical model and methods  
5.3.1 Model specification 
Consistent with the theory of optimal reserves and previous empirical work, the explanatory 
variables used in the analysis in this study are a representation of five categories of economic 
determinants: economic size, capital and financial accounts, the current account, exchange 
rate flexibility and opportunity cost.  
 The time-series model takes the following functional form:  
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡   =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛽5 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑡            (1) 
 
, where R  denotes the log of foreign exchange reserves to GDP valued in US dollars and 
minus gold, size  the economic size of China measured by population and GDP per capita, 
capacc  the capital account balance, broad money supply (M2) and FDI as a proxy for 
financial openness, curacc the current account balance and share of imports and exports in 
total output, xrt  the flexibility of the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar, and occ  the 
opportunity cost of capital. The variables specified in model (1) are defined in the variable 
statistics (Appendix A).  
 
5.3.2 Methods 
Time-series analysis relies on the assumption that variables are stationary and do not contain a 
unit root. Non-stationarity of the series is likely to result in ‘spurious regressions’, meaning 
that series which are seemingly related do not possess any statistically significant relationship 
in reality (Granger and Newbold, 1974). The Phillips-Perron (1988) and Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) (1981) tests are widely applied to detect if unit root may be present in time-
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series variables. Appendix B presents the results for the  test. The results of both tests show 
that the majority of the series are (first) difference-stationary, with the exception of  the 
variables FDI and population size which are stationary in levels.  
 In line with the stationarity tests, the analysis was initially based on a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model containing the full specification as summarized in table 2, with 
most of the series in first differences. However, the regressions indicated a high degree of 
multicollinearity, most notably between GDP, FDI and population size, and between the 
balance of payments (cubal and cabal) and import- and export ratios. Such a high level of 
collinearity between series could potentially lead to inconsistent results and it was 
subsequently decided to exclude FDI, population size and the capital-/current account 
variables from the analysis. The current model specification still includes at least one proxy 
per economic category. The remaining seven variables used in the final specification are 
highlighted in table 2. 
 Since the remaining variables are all I(1), a natural step is to examine if the series may 
be cointegrated and thus possibly indicate any long-run relationship(s) between variables. 
Cointegration refers to the phenomenon in which multiple series, while being non-stationary 
in levels, share a stochastic trend which resembles a linear relationship of long-run 
equilibrium between the series that is I(0) (Engle and Granger 1987). This study uses the 
Johansen’s multivariate cointegration procedure to detect the presence and number of 
cointegrating vectors in the underlying VAR (Johansen, 1995). The most parsimonious Vector 
Error Correction (VEC) model specification indicating cointegration includes GDP per capita, 
the broad money supply (M2) to GDP, import- and export-to-GDP ratios, the interest rate 
differential and exchange rate volatility. The trace-test provides evidence for two 
cointegrating vectors, suggesting that there exist two sets of cointegrating relationships 
between the variables. Since we can reject the null-hypothesis of no cointegration for each 
one of these variables, the results provide evidence for their long-run relationship with 
China’s demand for international reserves. 
  
5.3.3 Model evaluation 
Appendix C summarizes the results from several post-estimations of the VECM specification, 
with a focus on the econometric assumptions stated above and the overall fit of the model. 
The results of the formal La Grange-multiplier, run for eight lags, indicate that the VEC-
model does not have serious issues with serial correlation. The Jarque-Bera test further shows 
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that the residuals are normally distributed, and detects no severe problems with 
heteroscedasticity and skewness. The VEC-model and underlying VAR were run with 
different series, specifications and lag orders. The current model specification represents the 
best overall fit and results in terms of autocorrelation and the distribution of residuals.    
 
5.4 Results 
The VEC-analysis examines the short- (α) and long-term (β) determinants of  the demand for 
international reserves. Table 3 summarizes both the short- and long-run normalized 
coefficients of the model. The coefficient of the error correction term indicates the speed of 
adjustment of the model to long-run equilibrium. The error correction coefficient for the first 
cointegrating relationship equals -0.383 ,which means that the speed of adjustment to long-
run equilibrium in the VECM is 38%. The error coefficient for the second relationship is 
insignificant. According to the model’s average R-squared, the variables used in the analysis 
in this thesis explain roughly 60 percent of the variation in China’s reserve holdings between 
1980 and 2015.  
 The results from the analysis are mostly in line with hypothesized outcomes.  
* Economic size. Surprisingly, economic size measured by GDP per capita does not show any 
statistically significant effects on the demand for international reserves. This could very well 
be explained by the fact that the majority of other variables used in the analysis, including the 
independent variable, the money supply (M2) and export- and import ratios, are scaled in 
terms of GDP and ‘capture’ the effect of GDP growth on the size of holdings. 
* Capital account. In the short run, the money supply (M2) is found to be a statistically 
significant determinant of China’s demand for international reserves (10 percent level). A 1 
percent increase in the broad money supply will increase international reserves to GDP by 
almost 1.7 times. This finding can be related to the PBoC’s practice of sterilized intervention. 
The central bank has to print RMB in order to buy US dollars and other foreign exchange. 
The empirical evidence indicates that this leads to a short-term spike in the size of reserves, 
where the ratio of monetary base expansion to international reserves is equal to 1.7. In the 
long run, the broad money supply is negatively related to total reserve levels. This result is in 
line with expectations as well as previous studies by Ford and Huang (1994; 1995), who 
found that the years characterized by a high supply of money correspond with a reduction of 
China’s holdings of international reserves. It suggests that under such conditions, the PBoC  
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Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses (). *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. All series in logarithms except the opportunity cost of capital (occ). 
 
can effectively sterilize reserves which ostensibly decreases the size of reserve holdings in 
relation to other fundamentals.  
TABLE 3 
VEC-analysis 
 
* Foreign exchange reserves 
  
 
Short-run 
(normalized α) 
 
 
 
Long-run 
(normalized β) 
 
  
 
 
R²  
 
 
 
Notes 
Variable:       
       
Error correction term 
- Cointegrating equation (1) 
 
- Cointegrating equation (2)  
  
-0.383*** 
(0.142) 
0.1 
(0.102) 
   
 
 
 
- 33.6% 
 
 
 
       
 
Foreign exchange reserves  
 
GDP per capita 
 
Broad money supply (m2) 
 
Imports  
 
Exports  
 
Exchange rate flexibility 
 
Opportunity cost of capital 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.347 
(0.253) 
-1.011 
(0.848) 
1.675* 
(0.885) 
-0.352 
(0.543) 
-0.178 
(0.727) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
 
0.254* 
(0.146) 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
-1.118** 
(0.442) 
-4.64*** 
(0.677) 
2.058*** 
(0.646) 
-0.111*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.023) 
 
10.217 
 
  
0.484 
 
0.835 
 
0.771 
 
0.539 
 
0.639 
 
0.662 
 
0.241 
 
 
 
 
0.596 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59.6% 
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*Current account. When looking at the Johansen normalization, we can see that the ratio of 
exports to GDP is highly related to China’s long-run demand for foreign exchange. A 1 
percent increase in the size of exports more than doubles the size of the stock of reserves. As 
the largest exporting economy in the world, the PRC evidently accumulates foreign reserves 
as a hedge against external shocks from export volatility. Consistent with the hypothesis 
formulated earlier, the results show that imports are negatively correlated with long-run 
reserve demand in China. This could very well be an indicator of the dual-track allocation 
system for international reserves as part of the planned economy. Although relaxed in both de 
jure and de facto terms, the allocation system still plays a role in China.  
*Exchange rate flexibility. This study hypothesized that an increase in volatility of the 
exchange rate could easily trigger a fear of floating, encouraging policy-makers to increase 
the size of reserve holdings. Contrary to the hypothesized outcome but in line with general 
theory, the flexibility of the exchange rate is found to be negatively associated with the long-
run demand for international reserves. This finding suggests that the PBoC needs and 
demands fewer international reserves to peg the exchange rate if exchange rate volatility 
increases. The results indicate that the gradual introduction of (limited) floating rates leads to 
an 11 percent decrease in the long-run demand for international reserves.  
*Opportunity cost of capital. Lastly, the opportunity cost of capital is significant in explaining 
reserve levels and positively related to the dependent variable. This result may seem 
counterintuitive, but it may indicate that the opportunity cost of capital is not a high priority 
for the decision to accumulate foreign reserves. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In recent years, an increasing number of studies have attempted to empirically explain the 
rapid surge of foreign exchange reserves among emerging-market economies. The majority 
analyse the demand for international reserves for country groups in (macro)economic terms 
and disregard the political economy motivations that underpin this demand. This thesis has 
attempted to bridge these approaches through a single-country analysis of the People’s 
Republic of China, which explores the links between the structure of China’s politico-
economic model and the (macro)economic determinants of its demand for international 
reserves. The assessment of the political economy aspects suggests that monetary and foreign 
exchange reserve policies have been highly motivated by the Chinese leadership’s traditional 
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goal of rapid economic growth and social stability. Since the start of reforms, China’s 
monetary framework has been geared to generate external demand and inbound FDI which 
has maximized GDP at the cost of household consumption. Chinese households share in the 
cost of exchange rate intervention and other export-promoting policies in the form of financial 
repression. The findings resulting from the cointegration analysis provide evidence for a 
strong connection between China’s export- and investment led growth strategy and the 
determinants of its demand for international reserves. The results indicate that long-run 
demand is mainly associated with changes in the current account, which resembles China’s 
dependence on exports and the need for reserves as a precaution for export volatility. 
Furthermore, it shows that the influx of international reserves is highly related to changes in 
the money supply. This finding provides a ground to believe that reserve holdings have 
largely increased as a result of interventions to hold down domestic exchange and interest 
rates. However, the analysis also provide some evidence that exchange rate reforms have 
taken effect in recent years, leading to less demand for international reserves to stabilize 
exchange rates. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
Statistics 
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Std. Dev. 
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Max 
  
 
 
Observations 
Variable:      
fex 
 
gdp 
pop 
2.457 
 
6.722 
27.809 
1.087 
 
1.241 
0.11 
0.04 
 
5.053 
27.592 
3.856 
 
8.996 
27.949 
38 
 
38 
38 
 
cabal 
m2 
fdi 
 
1.21e-07 
4.569 
0.791 
 
1.78e-07 
0.579 
0.91 
 
0 
3.186 
-1.562 
 
5.87e-07 
5.309 
1.822 
 
38 
38 
38 
 
cubal 
import 
export 
 
8.65e12 
2.727 
2.823 
 
1.22e13 
0.457 
0.542 
 
-1.19e12 
1.628 
1.516 
 
4.21e13 
3.348 
3.616 
 
38 
38 
38 
 
xrt 
 
-0.409 
 
3.041 
 
-8.225 
 
3.913 
 
38 
 
occ 
 
0.4 
 
3.44 
 
-8.95 
 
6.63 
 
38 
Notes: All series in logarithms except current account balance (cubal), capital account balance (cabal) and 
interest rate differential (occ). The value of these variables equals 0 for a number of observed years, which, when 
logged, would be excluded from the analysis. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Notes: The Phillips-Perron and ADF-test reject the null-hypothesis of a unit root at the 1%***, 5%** and 10%* 
level, respectively (H0=unit root). The PP-test is run with 5 (Newey-West) lags for all variables; 5% critical 
value in parentheses (); Values for the ADF-test in levels represent the lag-size closest to the 5% critical value.  
 
 
 
 
Unit root 
tests 
 
 
 
 
Phillips - 
 
 
 
Perron 
 
 
 
Coefficient  
 
 
 
(Augmented)  
 
 
 
Dickey-Fuller 
 
 
 
Specification 
 
 
 
 
Order of 
Integration 
Variable: Levels Difference Levels/diff. Levels Difference   
 
fex 
 
gdp 
 
pop 
cabal 
-3.115 
 
-2.640 
 
-1.247 
1.497 
-22.881*** 
 
-20.462** 
 
-0.679 
-26.943*** 
 
0.905/0.159 
  
0.941/0.344 
 
0.967/0.984 
1.044/0.282 
  
-3.055 (-3.560) 
 
-1.191(-3.553) 
 
-6.406*** 
-0.330(-3.564) 
-4.900*** 
 
-4.009** 
 
n/a 
-4.234** 
 
Trend, 
intercept 
Trend, 
intercept 
Intercept 
Trend, 
intercept 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(0) 
I(1) 
 
m2 
 
fdi 
-6.798 
 
-4.990 
-26.403*** 
 
-17.329** 
0.808/0.032 
 
0.85/0.37 
-1.785(-3.560) 
 
-3.18** 
-4.661*** 
 
n/a 
Trend, 
intercept 
Intercept 
I(1) 
 
I(0) 
cubal 
 
import 
 
export 
-8.580 
 
-5.667 
 
-4.248 
-26.169*** 
 
-23.347** 
 
-24.093*** 
0.729/0.043 
 
0.816/0.111 
 
0.865/0.095 
-2.146(-3.568) 
 
-1.753(-3.552) 
 
-1.498(-3.552) 
-4.938*** 
 
-5.083*** 
 
-5.212*** 
Trend, 
intercept 
Trend, 
intercept 
Trend, 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(I) 
 
xrt 
 
-18.788* 
 
-30.838*** 
 
0.459/-0.157 
 
-3.517*(-3.552) 
 
 
-6.729*** 
Intercept 
Trend, 
intercept 
 
I(I) 
occ -6.102 -24.105*** 0.864/0.218 -1.617(-2.966) -4.852*** Intercept I(I) 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Evaluation 
 
 
(Jarque-Bera) 
Normality 
 
 
 
Kurtosis 
 
 
 
Skewness 
 
(Lagrange 
multiplier) 
Autocorrelation 
Variable: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lag  
fex 
gdp 
m2 
import 
export 
xrt 
occ 
 
ALL 
0.012 
0.701 
0.697 
0.711 
0.542 
0.906 
0.226 
 
0.354 
0.007 
0.444 
0.455 
0.416 
0.414 
0.816 
0.36 
 
0.153 
0.216 
0.724 
0.685 
0.885 
0.456 
0.706 
0.144 
 
0.7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 
 
0.933 
0.875 
0.871 
0.104 
0.598 
0.814 
0.528 
0.068 
 
Null-hypothesis 
 
H0: Residuals 
are normally 
distributed 
 
H0: 
normally 
distributed 
 
H0: 
normally 
distributed 
  
H0: No  
autocorrelation  
at lag order 
